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I. Introduction
Since dot-com billionaire Mark Cuban bought the Dallas
Mavericks in early 2000, he has changed the face of the franchise.
According to CNN/SI, his “energy and enthusiasm have helped revive
one of the league’s most dreadful teams and made him a local
celebrity. He’s further endeared himself to fans by absorbing all
service charges and handling fees on tickets.”1 At first glance, Cuban
appears to be a sports marketing genius.
In spite of this, it seems that his enthusiasm in marketing ticket
sales has not endeared him to all of the team’s fans. On December 13,
2000, Reynaldo Rodriguez applied full court pressure to Cuban and
the Mavericks by filing suit2 in a Texas state court, alleging violations
of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 19913 (TCPA), and
seeking certification as a class action.4
Plaintiff Rodriguez alleges that on November 22, 2000, he
received an unsolicited facsimile transmission with a Dallas
Mavericks logo offering tickets to “10 super games,” referred to as
the “Dallas Mavericks Superstar Plan,” as well as upcoming
individual games.5 Rodriguez further alleges that the Mavericks and
Cuban attempted to sell tickets by directing bulk fax broadcaster
American Blast Fax, Inc.6 to send promotional faxes to him and other
The advertisement instructs prospective purchasers
plaintiffs.7
desiring to buy Mavericks tickets to call the group ticket sales
number, access the Mavericks web page, or return the fax with the
purchaser’s name and phone number.8 The advertisement includes a

1. Associated Press, Mavs’ Owner Fined $250,000 for Criticizing Refs
<http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/basketball/nba/news/2001/01/04/cuban_fined_ap/index.ht
ml> (Jan. 5, 2001).
2. Rodriguez v. Cuban, No. 00-10002 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Dallas County Dist. filed Dec.
13, 2000).
3. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (1999).
4. P1. Original Pet. at 4-5, Rodriguez v. Cuban, No. 00-10002 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Dallas
County Dist. filed Dec. 13, 2000).
5. Id. at 3.
6. According to a press release by Texas Attorney General John Cornyn dated
February 8, 2000, American Blastfax, Inc. “violated the TCPA by engaging in a pattern or
practice of sending unsolicited faxes” to nearly 500,000 fax machines in and around Dallas,
Houston, and Austin, Texas. The Attorney General filed suit against American Blastfax,
Inc., after receiving consumer complaints, and after the Attorney General’s Office
received over 200 unsolicited faxes from American Blastfax. Press Release, Office of the
Attorney General, State of Texas, Cornyn Sues Broadcast Fax Business
<http://www.oag.state.tx.us/newspubs/releases/2000/20000208blastfax.htm> (Feb. 8, 2000).
7. P1. Original Pet. Rodriguez, slip op. at 3.
8. P1. Original Pet. Rodriguez, slip op. at Exh. 1.
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“do not call” number to call in order to delete the receiver’s phone
number from the fax list.9 Rodriguez alleges that the plaintiffs “did
not give their express invitation or permission to receive these
facsimile advertisements,”10 and, accordingly, that this advertisement
violates the provisions of the TCPA.11
Rodriguez filed the suit individually, as well as on behalf of all
others similarly situated, and requested certification as a class action
under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.12
The Mavericks were not the only Dallas sport franchise to be
sued under the TCPA, as another disgruntled fax recipient sued the
Dallas Cowboys for sending unsolicited advertisements by fax.13
Omnibus International, Inc., filed suit against the Dallas Cowboys
Football Club in state court in Dallas, alleging violations similar to
those included in the Mavericks suit.14 The unsolicited faxes declared
that tickets were available to Dallas Cowboys games, with the added
enticements that the recipient should “call now,” or that “to the
Cowboys, you’re the star – we’re calling your play.”15 The Cowboys
recently settled the suit for $1.73 million.16
Moreover, the Dallas sport teams were not the only ones using
unsolicited faxes to publicize their business. The official website for
Hooters Restaurants of Texas advertises that the food, service,
relaxed atmosphere and the “now famous Hooters Girls” combine
“to make Hooters the place for FUN, FUN, FUN!”17 Certainly, the
Hooters franchise in Augusta, Georgia, had a different type of fun in
mind when Sam Nicholson filed a class action suit against it for
sending unsolicited faxes to him and other prospective customers
promoting the fun available at the Augusta Hooters. After spending
several years resolving jurisdictional issues, a Georgia state judge
recently entered an $11,889,000 judgment against Hooters of
Augusta, Inc., for sending unsolicited faxes in violation of the

9. Id.
10. Id. at 3.
11. Id. at 4.
12. Id. at 4-5.
13. Omnibus International, Inc. v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., No. 00-00808
(Tex. Dist. Ct. K-192d Dist. Dallas County filed Jan. 29, 2001).
14. P1. Sec. Amend. Original Pet, Omnibus, slip op. at 2-7.
15. Id. at Exh. A.
16. Scott Hovanyetz, Dallas Cowboys Settle Junk-Fax Suit for $1.73 Million
<http://www.dmnews.com/cgi-bin/archives.cgi?article_id=18144> (Dec. 6, 2001).
17. Hooters Texas Official Website <http://www.hooterstexas.com/index.html>
(accessed Oct. 9, 2003).
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TCPA.18
These cases illustrate the hazards of sending unsolicited faxes to
advertise goods or services under the provisions of the TCPA. This
article analyzes what one court has called “an unusual constellation of
statutory features”19 contained in the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act, and will examine the legal effect of sending or
receiving unsolicited faxes.

II. The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991
A. Purpose of the TCPA

In response to complaints from outraged constituents who were
receiving annoying telephone calls from telemarketers, referred to as
“telephone terrorism,”20 Congress passed the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act on December 20, 1991.21 The act was codified at 47
U.S.C. § 227. In its “Congressional Statement of Findings,” Congress
found that “the use of the telephone to market goods and services to
the home and other businesses is now pervasive,”22 “unrestricted
telemarketing . . .can be an intrusive invasion of privacy,”23 and
“many consumers are outraged over the proliferation of intrusive,
nuisance calls to their homes from telemarketers.”24 The TCPA was
enacted to “protect the privacy interests of residential telephone
subscribers by placing restrictions on unsolicited, automated
telephone calls to the home and to facilitate interstate commerce by
restricting certain uses of facsimile (fax) machines and automatic
dialers.”25
While the provisions of the TCPA provide individuals and
businesses with protection from several means of telemarketing,26 the
18. Civil Action File No. 95-RCCV-616, Sam Nicholson and All Other Persons or
Entities Similarly Situated v. Hooters of Augusta, Inc. and Bambi Clark, d/b/a Value-Fax
of Augusta. See Judgment dated April 25, 2001 <http://www.junkfaxes.org/news/hoot12.pdf> (accessed Sep. 4, 2003).
19. Chair King, Inc. v. Houston Cellular Corp., 131 F.3d 507, 512 (5th Cir. 1997).
20. Hilary B. Miller & Robert R. Biggerstaff, Application of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act to Intrastate Telemarketing Calls and Faxes, 52 Fed. Comm. L.J. 667 (2000).
21. 47 U.S.C. § 227, Effective Date; Deadline for Regulations.
22. 47 U.S.C. § 227, Congressional Statement of Findings No. 1.
23. Id. Finding No. 5.
24. Id. Finding No. 6.
25. Intl. Science & Tech. Inst., Inc. v. Inacom Communications, Inc., 106 F.3d 1146,
1150 (4th Cir. 1997).
26. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A), (B), (D).
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scope of this article is limited to the legal effect of broadcast of
unsolicited facsimile transmissions used for marketing purposes. It
does not cover other protective provisions of the Act such as live or
prerecorded solicitation telephone calls, nor does it address the ongoing debate over junk electronic mail (called “spam”).27
B. Statutory Provisions Relating to Facsimile Transmissions

The provision of the TCPA applicable to unsolicited faxes is set
forth in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C), which states, “It shall be unlawful
for any person within the United States . . .(C) to use any telephone
facsimile machine, computer, or other device to send an unsolicited
advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine.”
An “unsolicited advertisement” is defined in 47 U.S.C. § 227
(a)(4) as “any material advertising the commercial availability or
quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any
person without that person’s prior express invitation or permission.”
In the event that Rodriguez proves his allegations at trial,
facsimile transmissions such as those allegedly sent by the Mavericks
fall within the statutory prohibitions since they were advertising the
commercial availability of services (providing Mavericks tickets),
were sent by a facsimile machine, and were unsolicited
28
advertisements.
C. Private Cause of Action and Remedies Available to Aggrieved Parties

In order to enforce the provisions of the Act, Congress granted
victimized individuals a private right of action for damages and

27. For information on regulation of spam, see Steven E. Bennett, Canning Spam:
CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 32 U. Rich. L. Rev. 545 (1998); Michael A.
Fisher, The Right to Spam? Regulating Electronic Junk Mail, 23 Colum.-Vla J. L. & Arts
363 (2000); Credence E. Fogo, The Postman Always Rings 4,000 Times: New Approaches
to Curb Spam, 18 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 915 (2000); Scot M. Graydon, Much
Ado About Spam: Unsolicited Advertising, the Internet, and You, 32 St. Mary’s L.J. 77
(2000); Sabra-Anne Kelin, State Regulation of Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail, 16
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 435 (2001); Gary S. Moorefield, Spam, It’s not Just for Breakfast
Anymore: Federal Legislation and the Fight to Free the Internet From Unsolicited
Commercial E-Mail, 5 B.U. Sci. & Tech. L. 10 (1999); Derek D. Simmons, No Seconds on
Spam: A Legislative Prescription to Harness Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail, 3 J. Small &
Emerging Bus. L. 389 (1999); David E. Sorkin, Technical and Legal Approaches to
Unsolicited Electronic Mail, 35 U.S.F. L. Rev. 325 (2001); David E. Sorkin, Unsolicited
Commercial E-Mail and the Telephone Consumer protection Act of 1991, 45 Buff. L. Rev.
1001 (1997); http://www.jmls.edu/cyber/index/spam.html; David E. Sorkin, Spam Laws
<http://www.spamlaws.com> (Aug. 8, 2003).
28. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C).
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injunctive relief.29 This right to sue, along with available remedies, is
found in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3), which provides:
A person or entity may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules
of court of a State, bring in an appropriate court of that State—(A)
an action based on a violation of this subsection or the regulations
prescribed under this subsection to enjoin such violation, (B) an
action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a violation, or
to receive $500 in damages for each such violation, whichever is
greater, or (C) both such actions. If the court finds that the
defendant willfully or knowingly violated this subsection or the
regulations prescribed under this subsection, the court may, in its
discretion, increase the amount of the award to an amount equal to
not more than 3 times the amount available under subparagraph
(B) of this paragraph.

Interestingly, Congress specifically authorized enforcement
actions to be brought in state courts, if permitted in state courts.30 In
most of the early cases brought under the TCPA, the question of state
or federal court jurisdiction was the pivotal issue for courts to resolve.
Almost all of these cases were filed in federal courts and challenged
the authority of Congress to establish jurisdiction in state courts. The
issue of jurisdiction will be discussed in detail later in this article.31
D. FCC Regulation

In order to enforce the provisions of the TCPA, Congress
directed the United States Federal Communications Commission to
implement rules, methods and procedures to control activities
regulated under the TCPA.32 In response to the Congressional
mandates, the FCC established rules regulating activities under the
TCPA.33 According to the FCC website, the telemarketing rules
became effective on December 20, 1992, and regulate “unsolicited
advertisements that use automatic telephone dialing systems, artificial
(computerized) or prerecorded voice messages, and fax machines.”34
In addition, the rules include “regulations to protect residential
telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to avoid receiving other

29. Chair King, 113 F.3d at 511.
30. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3).
31. See III.B., infra.
32. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2), (c), (d).
33. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200.
34. Federal Communications Commission, FCC home page, Telecommunications
Consumers Division – Subject Summary <http://www.fcc.gov/eb/tcd/summary.html.> (Apr.
11, 2002).
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unwanted telephone solicitations.”35

III. Case Analysis of Federal Court Litigation Issues
Although the TCPA became effective on December 20, 1992,36
there are very few reported federal cases. However, in those cases,
defendants have raised various Constitutional and jurisdictional
issues in an effort to defeat the claims of plaintiffs.
A. First Amendment Challenge – Commercial Speech

The earliest reported TCPA case, Destination Ventures, Ltd. v.
Federal Communications Commission, involved a challenge to the
constitutionality of the TCPA alleging that the ban on faxes violated
the First and Fifth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.37
Destination conducted seminars for travel agents and used faxes to
advertise these seminars.38
With regard to the First Amendment allegation, Destination
claimed that by prohibiting it from sending faxes of a commercial
nature, the TCPA violated its right to commercial free speech.39
Before any complaints or suits were filed against it, Destination made
a preemptive strike by filing suit against the FCC, seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief to prevent the TCPA from taking effect.40 The
FCC asked the court to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim,
while Destination moved for summary judgment on its claims that the
TCPA was unconstitutional because it impermissibly regulated
commercial speech.41 The District Court denied the summary
judgment motion and granted the FCC motion to dismiss.42
Destination appealed.
Commercial speech has been defined as “expression related
solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.”43
The First Amendment protects commercial speech from unwarranted

35. Id.
36. 47 U.S.C. § 227, Effective Date; Deadline for Regulations (2).
37. Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. Federal Communications Commission, 46 F.3d 54
(9th Cir. 1995).
38. Id. at 55.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S.
557, 561 (1980).
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governmental regulations,44 but it is clear that the government may
regulate commercial speech under certain circumstances.45 However,
the Constitution provides less protection to commercial speech than
to other constitutionally guaranteed speech.46 The protection
available for particular commercial expressions depends on both the
nature of the expression and the governmental interests served by the
regulation of the commercial speech.47 In order for the government to
regulate commercial speech without violating the First Amendment,
it must comply with the four-part test set forth by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. Public Service
48
Commission:
In commercial speech cases. . .a four-part analysis has developed.
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is
protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come
within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not
be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental
interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we
must determine whether the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more
49
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.

There was no discussion of the first issue, and Destination
conceded that the government met the second part of the test, i.e., it
had a substantial interest in restricting unsolicited faxes that shifted
the cost of advertising from the advertiser to the consumer who
owned the fax machine.50 However, Destination challenged the
restrictions based on the final two criteria from Central Hudson.51
44. Id.
45. Arlen W. Langvardt, Article: The Incremental Strengthening of First Amendment
Protection for Commercial Speech: Lessons from Greater New Orleans Broadcasting, 37
Am. Bus. L. J. 587, 599-600 (2000) (containing an analysis of the evolution of commercial
speech cases).
46. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 566.
49. Id.
50. Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 56. There was no allegation that the faxes were
either unlawful or misleading, thus avoiding scrutiny under the first part of the test.
51. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
“The limitation on expression must be designed carefully to achieve the State’s
goal. Compliance with this requirement may be measured by two criteria. First,
the restriction must directly advance the state interest involved; the regulation
may not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote support for the
government’s purpose. Second, if the governmental interest could be served as
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First, Destination alleged that the statutory regulation of the
TCPA failed to demonstrate a “reasonable fit” between the
substantial interests of the government and banning the fax
advertisements.52 Destination argued that the government53 did not
show that the unsolicited faxes containing advertising were more
costly to consumers than unsolicited faxes containing material other
than advertisements,54 and, accordingly, that regulating only faxes
containing advertising was unjustified because it did not advance the
government interest of reduced cost shifting.55 The Ninth Circuit
disagreed with Destination, holding that Congress was justified in
regulating only faxes containing advertising since one of the goals of
the TCPA was to prevent shifting of advertising costs from the
advertiser to the consumer.56 The court also found that the ban was
“evenhanded” because it applied to any commercial solicitation,
without differentiating among senders.57
Destination also argued that the regulation established by
Congress was more extensive than necessary to serve the public
interest by prohibiting advertising cost shifting.58 The court rejected
Destination’s argument that the costs shifted to the consumer were
minimal, and that regulating them was more excessive than necessary
to further the public interest.59
Based on its analysis, the Ninth Circuit determined that the ban
on unsolicited fax advertisements contained in the TCPA did not
violate the Free Speech provisions of the First Amendment.60 The
court did not address the Fifth Amendment issues since Destination
waived its claim by failing to argue them in its appellate brief.61
B. Federal Court Jurisdiction

Most of the early reported cases seeking damages under the
well by a more limited restriction on commercial speech, the excessive
restrictions cannot survive.”
52. Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 56.
53. Id. at 55 (“The burden is on the government to demonstrate the reasonable fit.”).
54. Id. at 56.
55. Id. (“[B]anning them [unsolicited commercial fax solicitations] is a reasonable
means to achieve Congress’s goal of reducing cost shifting.”).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 57.
61. Id.
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TCPA were filed by plaintiffs in federal district courts.62 Defendants
challenged the jurisdiction of the United States District Courts to
hear TCPA cases based on the language contained in 47 U.S.C. §
227(b)(3) that “a person . . . may, if otherwise permitted by the laws
or rules of court of a State, bring in an appropriate court of that
State” an action under the TCPA. The Second,63 Third,64 Fourth,65
Fifth,66 Ninth67 and Eleventh68 Circuit Courts of Appeal have been
unanimous in holding that state courts have exclusive jurisdiction of
cases arising under the TCPA.69 The only published decision reaching
a different conclusion was decided by a federal district court.70
The first reported case in which the defendant challenged
jurisdiction was International Science & Technology Institute, Inc. v.
71
Inacom Communications, Inc. In the summer of 1995, International
Science received by fax several unsolicited transmissions advertising
Inacom’s discount long-distance telephone service.72 In response,
International Science filed a class action lawsuit in United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, seeking statutory
damages and an injunction to prohibit future transmission of
unsolicited advertisements.73 The court dismissed the case for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, holding that “private actions authorized
by the TCPA may be filed only in state courts,”74 explaining that the
“language in § 227(b)(3) is unambiguous”75 and “clearly places
jurisdiction for a private right of action in the state courts.”76
62. International Science, 106 F.3d 1146; Chair King, 131 F.3d 507; Nicholson v.
Hooters of Augusta, Inc., 136 F.3d 1287 ( 11th Cir. 1998); Erienet, Inc. v. Velocity Net, Inc.,
156 F.3d 513 ( 3rd Cir. 1998); Foxhall Realty Law Offices, Inc. v. Telecommunications
Premium Services, Ltd., 156 F.3d 432 ( 2nd Cir. 1998); Murphey v. Warren Lanier, 204 F.3d
911 ( 9th Cir. 2000); but see Kenro, Inc. v. Fax Daily, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 912 (1995)
(reconsideration denied in Kenro, 962 F. Supp. 1162, in which the TCPA case was filed in
state Superior Court in Indiana, but removed by agreement to the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division).
63. Foxhall Realty, 156 F.3d 432.
64. Erienet, 156 F.3d 513.
65. International Science, 106 F.3d 1146.
66. Chair King, 131 F.3d 507.
67. Murphey, 204 F.3d 911.
68. Nicholson, 136 F.3d 1287.
69. Murphey, 204 F.3d at 915.
70. Id. at 913 (citing Kenro, 904 F. Supp. 912, 914).
71. 106 F.3d 1146.
72. International Science, 106 F.3d at 1150.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1151.
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International Science appealed on three grounds:77 (1) The
permissive language of § 227(b)(3) that a private action may be
brought in state courts does not create exclusive jurisdiction in state
courts;78 (2) federal courts have federal-question jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1331 since the TCPA “arises under” federal law;79 and (3) a
grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the states would violate both the
Tenth,80 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth,81
Amendments.
In addressing the first ground, the Fourth Circuit scrutinized the
text of the TCPA in an attempt to determine Congressional intent.82
The court found it “meaningful” that Congress mentioned only state
courts in the statute,83 that it was “significant” that Congress
conferred federal jurisdiction over actions by state attorneys general
but authorized state court jurisdiction for private rights of action,84
and that the legislative history85 of the TCPA established that the
77. Id.
78. The pertinent language in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) states “a person or entity may, if
otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State, bring in an appropriate court
of that State . . . ” (emphasis added).
79. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 reads: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”
80. U. S. Const. amend. X.
81. U. S. Const. amend. XIV.
82. International Science, 106 F.3d at 1151 (“To discern whether Congress intended to
authorize jurisdiction over private actions exclusively in state courts, we first turn, as we
must, to the TCPA’s text.”).
83. Id. at 1152 (“While state courts are presumed to have jurisdiction over federally
created causes of action unless Congress indicates otherwise, see Tafflin, 493 U.S. at 461
[“mere grant of jurisdiction to a federal court does not operate to oust a state court from
concurrent jurisdiction”], federal courts require a specific grant of jurisdiction, see
Sheldon, 49 U.S. at 449. In light of this difference between the federal and state courts, it is
meaningful that Congress explicitly mentioned only state courts in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)
because under usual circumstances, mentioning state courts is unnecessary to vest them
with concurrent jurisdiction.”).
84. Id. (”We find it significant that in enacting the TCPA, Congress wrote precisely,
making jurisdictional distinctions in the very same section of the Act by providing that
private actions may be brought in appropriate state courts and that actions by the states
must be brought in the federal courts. These jurisdictional distinctions are even more
significant in light of the rest of the Communications Act where Congress provided
explicitly for concurrent jurisdiction when it so intended.”).
85. Id. at 1152-53, quoting the bill’s sponsor in the Senate, Senator Hollings [137
Cong. Rec. S16205-06 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) as saying:
The provision would allow consumers to bring an action in State court against
any entity that violates the bill . . . it is my hope that States will make it as easy as
possible for consumers to bring such actions, preferably in small claims court . . .
I thus expect that the States will act reasonably in permitting their citizens to go
to court to enforce this bill.
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Congressional intent was for state courts to handle claims “so long as
states allow such actions.”86 With respect to the first appellate point,
the court found that jurisdiction of private actions was exclusively in
state courts because Congress “did not intend to confer concurrent
jurisdiction on the United States district courts.”87
The court then considered the second appellate point, i.e., that
the general federal-question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331,88 conferred
jurisdiction on the district court, since a claim derived from the TCPA
“arises under” federal law.89 Article III of the United States
Constitution grants federal courts judicial power “in all cases, in law
and equity, arising under” the Constitution, laws and treaties of the
United States,90 but inferior federal courts have only the jurisdiction
that Congress confers upon them.91 While International Science
argued that jurisdiction was available under § 1331, the court
disagreed, reasoning that since Congress specifically granted
jurisdiction to state courts under the TCPA, the specific grant in the
TCPA took priority over the general statute:92
It is clear, however, that § 1331 is a general federal-question statute,
which gives the district courts original jurisdiction unless a specific
statute assigns jurisdiction elsewhere . . . Thus, the federal law that
creates a cause of action may also manifest a particular intent to
assign the cause of action to courts other than district courts,
notwithstanding the general principle announced in § 1331 . . . The
particularized congressional intent manifested in 47 U.S.C. §
227(b)(3) governs, not the general proposition announced in §
93
1331.

Finally, the court focused on the Constitutional issues raised by
94
International Science, alleging that finding exclusive jurisdiction
would result in a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment,95 and that interpreting the statute as
86. Id. (“[W]e believe the clear thrust of [Sen. Hollings’] statement was consistent
with the bill’s text that state courts were the intended for a for private TCPA actions.”)
87. Id.
88. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
89. International Science, 106 F.3d at 1153.
90. U. S. Const. art. III, § 2.
91. Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441, 449 (1850). (“Courts created by statute can have no
jurisdiction but such as the statute confers. No one of them can assert a just claim to
jurisdiction exclusively conferred on another, or withheld from all.”)
92. International Science, 106 F.3d at 1154-55.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1155-56.
95. U. S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its

2003]

THE PERILS OF TELEMARKETING UNDER THE TCPA

243

creating exclusive state jurisdiction would infringe upon states’ rights
under the Tenth Amendment.96
The court correctly pointed out that the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to states, and the equal
protection element of the Fifth Amendment must be used to
challenge a federal statute.97 Notwithstanding the technical inaccuracy
in International Science’s appellate point, the court considered its
argument that the TCPA phrase “if otherwise permitted by the laws
or rules of a court of [that] State,” would create a situation allowing
citizens of some states to have the benefit of the TCPA, while citizens
of other states (whose Legislatures choose not to allow TCPA actions
in its courts) would not have the same benefit.98
While the TCPA creates the private action described above,99 it
also contains a provision authorizing the attorneys general of the
several states to bring actions on behalf of their citizens for damages
and injunctive relief under the TCPA,100 regardless of whether or not
a state chose to prohibit private TCPA actions in its courts.101 If a
state did choose to prohibit jurisdiction of private TCPA actions in its
courts, its citizens would nonetheless continue to have substantive
rights identical to citizens of other states, i.e., “to be free from
unsolicited faxes” by virtue of actions brought by that state’s
Attorney General.102 The court disposed of the Equal Protection
argument by concluding that “the fact that private actions under the
TCPA may be permitted in some state courts and prohibited in
others, as determined by the states, does not render the TCPA
violative of the equal protection component of the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.”103
International Science’s final allegation was that that Congress
violated the Tenth Amendment by creating exclusive state
jurisdiction over private TCPA actions, in this manner interfering
“with the Tenth Amendment rights of states to govern without
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
96. U. S. Const. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people.”).
97. International Science, 106 F.3d at 1156.
98. Id.
99. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) (2000).
100. 47 U.S.C. § 227(f) (2000) (for a discussion of this subsection, see IV(D) and V(B),
hereinafter).
101. International Science, 106 F.3d at 1156.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1157.
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meddling from the federal government,” thereby “impermissibly . . .
commandeer[ing] state courts.”104 The court disagreed, citing the
jurisdictional qualifier “if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of
court of a State,”105 and concluded that “Congress went out of its way
to avoid overstepping the limits of the Tenth Amendment by
explicitly recognizing the states’ power to reject enforcement in their
courts of the federally created right.”106 The court determined that
Congress, by making the private action permissive in state courts,
avoided a Tenth Amendment constitutional issue “by refusing to
coerce states to hear private TCPA actions,”107 thereby leaving the
ultimate determination of the availability of private TCPA state
actions to the individual states.108 In summarizing the Tenth
Amendment issue, the court stated its opinion that Congress acted to
enhance state sovereignty: “Congress enacted the TCPA to assist
states where they lacked jurisdiction; it empowered states themselves
to enforce the TCPA in federal court; it authorized private
enforcement exclusively in state courts; and it recognized state power
to reject Congress’ authorization.”109
Based on its analysis, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the District
Court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,110 and thereby
reached the “somewhat unusual conclusion”111 that state courts have
exclusive jurisdiction over TCPA actions created by federal law.112
The International Science case has been called “the most thorough
and influential of the opinions finding no federal jurisdiction”113 and
has been cited and relied upon in virtually every subsequent case.
A few months later, the Fifth Circuit was faced with similar
issues in Chair King, Inc. v. Houston Cellular Corporation.114 In that
case, Houston Cellular had sent unsolicited advertising faxes to Chair
King and others, prompting Chair King to sue under 47 U.S.C. §
227(b)(3).115 The case was filed in the United States District Court for
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
1998).
114.
115.

Id.
47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) (2000).
International Science, 106 F.3d at 1157.
Id. at 1158.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1150.
Id.
Lewis v. Gitt, n. 2, No. 97-7216, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9186 (E.D. Pa. June 22,
131 F.3d 507 (5th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 509.
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the Southern District of Texas, which dismissed the case,116 resulting
in an appeal by Chair King.117 The court characterized the TCPA as
“an unusual constellation of statutory features, viz., the express
creation of a private right of action, an express jurisdictional grant to
state courts to entertain them, and silence as to federal court
jurisdiction of private actions.”118
The court was faced with the same jurisdictional issues discussed
in International Science. Chair King attempted to establish
jurisdiction in federal court under Article III of the U. S.
Constitution,119 and 28 U.S.C. § 1331,120 which required the court to
also construe the statutory language and determine Congressional
intent.121 Like the Fourth Circuit in International Science, the Fifth
Circuit concluded that state courts have exclusive jurisdiction of the
private actions available under the TCPA.122 Because the District
Court had no jurisdiction, the Fifth Circuit vacated the judgment of
the District Court and remanded the case with directions to dismiss
the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.123
The next court to address jurisdictional issues under the TCPA
was the Eleventh Circuit in Nicholson v. Hooters of Augusta, Inc.124
Plaintiff Nicholson alleged that he received unsolicited
advertisements on his fax machine from Hooters, and filed suit under
the provisions of the TCPA in the state Superior Court of Richmond
County, Georgia.125 Hooters successfully removed the case to the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia,
then filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted.126
Hooters’ motion to dismiss was based on two issues: (1) The
TCPA did not provide a private right of action to citizens of Georgia,
116. Id. (“The District Court dismissed all claims except the trespass to chattels
claim”).
117. Id. (The court notes that the appeal was also taken by the “insurance
defendants”; however, the court does not discuss the grounds of the insurance defendants’
appeal).
118. Id. at 512.
119. Id. at 510.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 511-12.
122. Id. at 514 (“After reviewing the TCPA’s text, purpose, and history, we conclude
Congress intended the state courts to have exclusive jurisdiction over private actions filed
under the TCPA.”).
123. Id.
124. 136 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 1998).
125. Id. at 1288.
126. Id.
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and (2) the act applied only to interstate (not intrastate)
transmissions.127 The District Court granted Hooters’ motion on both
grounds,128 holding that the TCPA applied only to interstate faxes129
and that Nicholson could not maintain a private right of action under
the TCPA.130 In ruling on the private right issue, the District Court
reasoned that the TCPA language “if otherwise permitted by the laws
or rules of the court of a State”131 authorized a private right of action
“only if state law specifically authorized a private action,”132 and since
Georgia law did not permit private actions, there could be no private
action in federal court.133
The Eleventh Circuit did not address the merits of either of the
District Court’s reasons for dismissing the case.134 It should be noted
that neither International Science nor Chair King had been decided or
reported at the time the appeal was taken, but were decided before
the Eleventh Circuit rendered its decision.135 The court “carefully
examined” the reasoning of the courts in those cases and agreed that
“federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction of private actions
under the Act.”136 With regard to Hooters’ argument (allowed first on
appeal)137 that federal-question jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. §
1331, the court held that “the general jurisdictional grant of section
1331 does not apply if a specific statute assigns jurisdiction
elsewhere.”138 The court vacated the judgment of the District Court
and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the case for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.139
The next court to consider the TCPA jurisdictional questions was
the Third Circuit in Erienet, Inc. v. Velocity Net, Inc.140 The plaintiffs
were an Internet service provider (Erienet) and its subscribers who
had received unsolicited e-mail messages from VelocityNet, a

127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. (“Because Nicholson received an intrastate facsimile, the court held there
could be no claim under the Act.”)
130. Id.
131. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(2000).
132. Nicholson, 136 F.3d at 1288.
133. Id.
134. Later cases addressed these issues; see IV(A) and (B).
135. Nicholson, 136 F.3d at 1289.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. 156 F.3d 513 (3rd Cir. 1998).
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competitor of Erienet.141 The district court dismissed the case for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction.142 On appeal, the Third Circuit reached
the same conclusion as the other courts and affirmed the dismissal.143
Like the other circuits, the court addressed the issues of
interpretation of Congressional intent regarding jurisdiction144 and the
applicability of the general grant of federal question jurisdiction
contained in § 1331.145 The appellants also presented a new and novel
argument for federal court jurisdiction, contending that jurisdiction
was proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1337(a), which provides original
jurisdiction in federal district courts of “any civil action or proceeding
arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce.”146 The court
rejected the argument, concluding that “any action that could be
brought in federal court under § 1337 could also be brought under §
1331.”147
It should also be noted that this is the first, and thus far only,
reported circuit court opinion that included a dissent in which the
dissenting judge would have found that federal courts have
jurisdiction of private TCPA actions based on § 1331.148
Another first in this case is the action having been brought based
upon the defendant sending “unsolicited e-mail messages to ErieNet
subscribers in violation of the TCPA.”149 The court did not discuss the
applicability of the TCPA to electronic mail messages in its opinion,
but did make mention of the plaintiffs’ attempt to use the private
action provisions of the TCPA in a footnote.150
The next reported case was decided by the Second Circuit in
Foxhall Realty Law Offices, Inc. v. Telecommunications Premium
151
Services, Ltd. The suit was brought by Foxhall Realty as a class
141. Id. at 514.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 520.
144. Id. at 515-18.
145. Id. at 519.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 520-22.
148. Id. at 521-22. Judge Alito, in his dissenting opinion, asserts:
“[I]t is clear that the language of the TCPA is insufficient to divest district courts
of their federal question jurisdiction, as the statute merely provides that private
suits ‘may’ be brought in state court,” and “I would hold that the TCPA’s
permissive grant of jurisdiction to state courts does not constitute an ‘explicit
statutory directive’ sufficient to divest district courts of their section 1331 federal
question jurisdiction.”
149. Id. at 514.
150. Erienet, 156 F.3d at 514 n.1.
151. 156 F.3d 432 (2nd Cir. 1998).

248

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

[25:231

action on behalf of “all New Yorkers who allegedly received ‘junk’
facsimile advertisements from TPS.”152 Foxhall presented essentially
the same arguments as the earlier plaintiffs in other circuits, but the
court agreed with the previous cases by finding that state courts have
exclusive jurisdiction over private actions under the TCPA,153 and
affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.154
In Murphey v. Lanier,155 the attorney plaintiff was a solo
practitioner specializing in patents, copyrights and trademarks,156 who
received an unsolicited fax transmission from Lanier “advertising
computer systems.”157 Two days after receiving the fax, Murphey filed
suit in United States District Court for the Southern District of
California, seeking $500 in damages and an injunction against
defendants under the private action provisions of the TCPA.158 Faced
with the same arguments as the earlier circuit courts, the district court
relied on International Science and dismissed the complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.159 The district court decision was affirmed
by the Ninth Circuit.160
The only reported case that reached a different conclusion161 is
the 1997 case of Kenro, Inc., v. Fax Daily, Inc.162 The court was faced
with a case of first impression163 that had “not been addressed by any
court in the United States”164 at the time of filing. Kenro filed a class
action in state court alleging violation of the TCPA,165 but one of the
152. Id. at 434.
153. Id. at 435 (“We agree with, and adopt, the reasoning of the Fourth and Fifth
Circuits that Congress intended to confer exclusive state court jurisdiction over private
rights of action under the TCPA.”).
154. Id. at 438.
155. 204 F.3d 911 (9th Cir. 2000).
156. Id. at 912.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 915 (“We join the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits in ‘the
somewhat unusual conclusion that state courts have exclusive jurisdiction over a cause of
action created by a federal statute.’”).
161. Id. at 913.
162. There are two Kenro decisions: the first (“Kenro I”) was decided on November 8,
1995, and appears at 904 F. Supp. 912; the second (“Kenro II”) was decided on April 10,
1997, on a Motion to Reconsider after the Fourth Circuit’s decision in International
Science, and appears at 962 F. Supp. 1162. All references to “Kenro” are to the second
opinion, unless otherwise noted.
163. Kenro I, 904 F. Supp. at 914.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 912.
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defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Indiana166 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441.167 In
considering Kenro’s motion to remand to state court, the district
court found that the suit presented a “federal question” by alleging a
violation of the TCPA;168 that the permissive state court jurisdiction
language of the TCPA did not “repeal” federal jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1331;169 and that state court jurisdiction was not exclusive,
but concurrent,170 reasoning that “if Congress had intended to provide
for exclusive state jurisdiction, it would have done so with clear
mandatory language, rather than using the permissive word ‘may.’”171
After publication of International Science, plaintiff Kenro moved
for reconsideration of its motion to remand, but the district court
disagreed with the Fourth Circuit172 and again the motion was
denied.173

IV. State Issues Arising Under the TCPA
Although the circuit courts that have addressed the issue of
jurisdiction under the TCPA have unanimously held that state courts
have exclusive jurisdiction of private actions,174 jurisdiction is not the
only contested state issue under the TCPA. Litigants in state courts
have raised questions about related matters not specifically addressed
by Congress in the TCPA. However, certain other provisions in the
TCPA clearly establish some rights and obligations accruing to the
states.
166. Id.
167. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) provides: “Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of
Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the
United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the
defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing
the place where such action is pending.”
168. Kenro I, 904 F. Supp. at 914.
169. Id. at 915.
170. Id.
171. Kenro II, 962 F. Supp. at 1164; see Jeffrey Danile, Foxhall Realty Law Offices, Inc.
v. Telecommunications Premium Services, Ltd.: The Second Circuit Concludes that New
York State Courts Have Exclusive Jurisdiction Over Private Rights of Action Asserted
Under § 227 of the Federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 73 St. John’s L.
Rev. 613 (1999).
172. Id. (“After carefully considering the International Science decision, we
respectfully disagree with the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation of the TCPA and stand by
our conclusion that, had Congress intended to supersede the federal question jurisdiction
provided by § 1331 and instead provide for exclusive state court jurisdiction, it could and
would have done so with clear language to that effect.”)
173. Id.
174. Murphey, 204 F.3d at 915.
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A. Availability of TCPA Private Actions in State Courts: The “Opt-In” or
“Opt-Out” Conundrum

Although jurisdiction of private actions under the TCPA has
been held to be exclusively in state courts, Congress permitted private
actions to be filed in state courts only “if otherwise permitted by the
laws or rules of court of a State.”175 The obvious question that arises
is: what is the effect of the permissive jurisdiction language, “if
otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State?” When a
private action under the TPCA is filed in state court, two theories
have been successfully argued to resolve whether actions are
permitted in state court.176 The two options have been described as
“opt-in” or “opt-out.”177
The “opt-in” theory contends that state courts are available to
hear cases only when the state Legislature passes an affirmative
statute specifically allowing private TCPA actions.178 The “opt-out”
theory maintains that Congress has created a federal cause of action
with jurisdiction in state courts unless the state Legislature passes
legislation closing its courts to TCPA actions.179 Unlike the issue of
federal jurisdiction, the courts have not been unanimous, and have
created a “cacophony of conflicting interpretations.”180

175. 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(3).
176. The two theories discussed deal only with the TCPA, and not individual state
laws regulating unsolicited faxes.
177. Robert R. Biggerstaff, State Courts and the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
of 1991: Must States Opt-In? Can States Opt-Out?, 33 Conn. L. Rev. 407 (2001).
178. Id. at 412.
179. Id. at 412-13.
180. Id. at 412; see n. 22, which describes two courts in the same courthouse reaching
opposite conclusions in separate cases.
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1. The “Opt-Out” States

The first state court case to address the permissive language was
181
Kaplan v. Democrat and Chronicle, in which the claimant had
received three unsolicited telephone calls to his residence soliciting
newspaper subscriptions,182 resulting in the filing of a small claims
action under the TCPA.183 In a very short opinion, the Supreme Court
of New York, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, citing
International Science, held that “[i]n the absence of a State statute
declining to exercise the jurisdiction authorized by the statute, a State
court has jurisdiction over TCPA claims. New York has not refused
to exercise such jurisdiction.”184
A New Jersey court considered the same issue in Zelma v. Total
185
Remodeling, Inc., in which the plaintiff received several telephone
solicitations after requesting that she be placed on the “do not call”
list.186 The court articulated the dispute stating that “[t]he main legal
issue to be decided is whether the Legislature of the State of New
Jersey must affirmatively enable courts of this state to hear private
claims arising under the TCPA.”187 The court reviewed International
Science, Foxhall Realty, Kaplan and other cases, then concluded that
“[c]ongressional intent . . . does not condition state court jurisdiction
over private enforcement of TCPA claims on an affirmative
legislative act creating such jurisdiction.”188
Exactly six months after Kaplan, the Supreme Court of New
York, Appellate Division, Second Department, followed Kaplan and
held that a TCPA private right of action may be brought in a New
York state court.189 In Schulman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, Melissa
Schulman received approximately 60 automated or prerecorded
telephone calls on her residential phone, after which she gave Chase
Manhattan oral and written notices to discontinue the solicitation
calls.190 Thereafter, she received another 75 calls.191 The trial court

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

th

266 A.D.2d 848 (N.Y. App. 4 Dept. 1999).
Kaplan, 266 A.D.2d at 848.
Id.
Id.
334 N.J. Super. 140 (N.J. Super. L. Div. 2000).
Id. at 142.
Id.
Id. at 143.
268 A.D.2d 174 (N.Y. App. 2nd Dept. 2000).
Id. at 176-77.
Id at 177.
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denied Chase Manhattan’s motion to dismiss the complaint for failure
to state a cause of action,192 and the Appellate Division affirmed.193
Chase Manhattan argued that the permissive language required
states to “enact legislation or regulations which expressly authorize
the prosecution of a private right of action in the State courts.”194 The
court rejected such an interpretation by holding that “State courts are
courts of general jurisdiction and are presumed to have jurisdiction
over Federally created causes of action unless Congress dictates
otherwise.”195 The court found that the legislative history establishes
that “Congress made a deliberate choice to confer exclusive
jurisdiction [to] State courts”196 and that “Congress has clearly
expressed its intent that State courts have jurisdiction over private
claims under the statute.”197 The court quoted from the U.S. Supreme
Court case of Howlett v. Rose:198
“Federal law is enforceable in state courts not because Congress
has determined that federal courts would otherwise be burdened or
that state courts might provide a more convenient forum—although
both might well be true—but because the Constitution and laws
passed pursuant to it are as much laws in the States as laws passed
by the state legislature. The Supremacy Clause makes those laws
‘the supreme Law of the Land,’ and charges state courts with a
coordinate responsibility to enforce that law according to their
199
regular modes of procedure.”

Although Kaplan, Zelma, and Schulman involved unsolicited
telephone calls rather than fax transmissions, the issues are equally
applicable to unsolicited faxes since both actions are prohibited under
47 U.S.C. § 227(b).200
Not deterred by the order of dismissal entered by the Eleventh
Circuit in Nicholson v. Hooters of Augusta, Inc.,201 Sam Nicholson
then turned to the Georgia state courts to seek redress under the

192. Id. at 174.
193. Id. at 179.
194. Schulman, 268 A.D.2d at 177.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 178.
197. Id.
198. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990).
199. Id. at 367.
200. Telephone calls are prohibited under section (1)(b) and fax transmissions are
prohibited under section (1)(c) of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (1991).
201. See discussion in III(B) infra.
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TCPA.202 In Hooters of Augusta, Inc. v. Nicholson,203 Nicholson filed a
class action suit against Bambi Clark d/b/a Value-Fax of Augusta and
Hooters of Augusta, Inc., alleging that they sent unsolicited
advertisements in violation of the TCPA.204 Hooters urged the
Georgia court to adopt the “opt-in” standard,205 while Nicholson
argued for the “opt-out,”206 which the trial court adopted.207 The
Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the “opt-out” decision by the trial
court, concluding “the absence of a statute declining to exercise the
jurisdiction authorized by the TCPA gives Georgia citizens the right
(in Georgia state courts) to seek the relief provided by the TCPA.”208
209
Aronson v. Fax.Com, Inc. was a case of first impression in
Pennsylvania.210 Mark Aronson received five unsolicited advertising
faxes from Fax.Com over a period of two months, which resulted in
his filing a TCPA suit in state court.211 Pennsylvania has not enacted
any legislation expressly authorizing TCPA actions, and defendant
filed a motion to dismiss arguing for an “opt-in” standard.212 The trial
court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss, holding that “[the TCPA
permissive clause] does not require the states to enact legislation to
open courts that are already open,”213 and “[s]tate courts hear federal
private causes of action unless they are ousted because the states
want their citizens to be able to enforce their federal rights of action
in their own state courts.”214
In Worsham v. Nationwide Insurance Company,215 the plaintiff
filed suit in Maryland state court alleging violations for advertising

202. The case was originally filed in Civil Action File No. 95-RCCV-616 in the
Superior Court of Richmond County, Georgia. It was removed to the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Georgia before dismissal by the Eleventh
Circuit, after which Nicholson prosecuted the case in state court.
203. 245 Ga. App. 363 (Ga. App., 2000), cert. denied, (Ga. Jan. 19, 2001).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 364.
207. Id. at 366.
208. Id.
209. 2001 WL 246855 (Pa. Com. Pl. Feb. 28, 2001).
210. Id. at *1.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at *3.
214. Id. at *5.
215. 2001 WL 461313 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. May 3, 2001). Note: This opinion has not
been released for publication at the time this article was submitted for publication, and is
subject to being revised or withdrawn.

254

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

[25:231

telephone calls.216 The Maryland court quoted from Kaplan, and
assumed an “opt-in” position since “Maryland has not refused to
exercise such (TCPA state court) jurisdiction.”217
In Reynolds v. Diamond Foods & Poultry, Inc., 218 the plaintiff
sued in Missouri state court alleging violation of the TCPA, but the
trial court dismissed the suit finding that there was no private right of
action in Missouri under the TCPA because the Missouri legislature
had not passed enabling legislation (the “opt-in” stance).219 The Court
of Appeals reversed, finding that “legislatures do not need to pass
enabling legislation to create a private right of action under the
TCPA in state courts.”220
2. The “Opt-In” State

Only one court has reached a different conclusion and adopted
the “opt-in” standard.221 In the Texas case of Autoflex Leasing, Inc. v.
222
Manufacturers Auto Leasing, Inc., the plaintiff filed suit under the
TCPA in state court seeking monetary damages and an injunction.223
The parties were competitors in the auto leasing business, and
Manufacturers allegedly transmitted at least 37 unsolicited faxes to
Autoflex.224 Manufacturers filed a motion for summary judgment
arguing the “opt-in” standard, i.e., that Texas had not authorized
private TCPA actions at the time the faxes were sent and received.225
The trial court granted Manufacturers’ motion and dismissed
Autoflex’s suit without specifying the grounds for its decision.226
On appeal, the court of appeals addressed the parties’
arguments. Manufacturers contended that the Texas legislature must
pass “enabling legislation” before suit was available in Texas (“optin”), and Autoflex contended that suit is available “unless legislation
prohibits” private TCPA actions (“opt-out”).227 The court agreed with
216. Id. at *1.
217. Id. at *5.
218. 2002 WL 171438 (Mo. App. E.D., Feb. 5, 2002). Note: This opinion has not been
released for publication at the time this article was submitted for publication, and is
subject to being revised or withdrawn.
219. Id. at *1.
220. Id. at *3.
221. 2001 WL246855 at *6.
222. 16 S.W.3d 815 (Tex. App. Ft. Worth 2000).
223. Id. at 816
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 816-17.
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Manufacturers and held “that Congress intended the states to pass
legislation or promulgate court rules consenting to state court actions
based on the TCPA, before such suits under the TCPA may be
brought in state courts.”228
In a cruel twist of fate for Autoflex, while the case was on appeal
but before the announcement of a decision by the Court of Appeals,
the Texas Legislature adopted statutory language specifically
authorizing private TCPA actions.229 Unfortunately for Autoflex,
Texas’ adoption of the TCPA private cause of action was too late to
support Autoflex’s suit.230
B. Applicability of the TCPA to Strictly Intrastate Faxes

Enterprising defendants have argued that purely intrastate
solicitations are immune from regulation under the TCPA, suggesting
that Congress implemented the TCPA in order to regulate only
interstate solicitations.231 In Hooters of Augusta, Inc. v. Nicholson,232
the defendant contended that intrastate communications were not
subject to the Communications Act,233 relying on 47 U.S.C. § 152(a),
which limits the Communications Act to interstate and foreign
communications.234 However, the court found that “Congress
expressed its intent to regulate both interstate and intrastate
communications under the TCPA by amending 47 U.S.C. § 152(b)235
to specifically except the TCPA from . . . § 152(a).”236 Although the
court did not cite Congressional testimony to determine legislative
intent, it is clear that both intrastate and interstate calls were covered
by the Act.237

228. Id. at 817.
229. Id. at 817-18; Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 35.47(f) (Vernon Supp. 2002).
230. For a more thorough discussion of unsolicited faxes in Texas under the TCPA
and Texas law, see Paul J. Batista, Just the Fax, Ma’am: Do Unsolicited Faxes Violate Texas
Law?, 10 Texas Entertainment and Sports Law Journal, 4-7 (No. 1, Spring 2001).
231. Hooters, 245 Ga. App. at 366.
232. Id. at 363.
233. Id. at 366.
234. 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (2000) states: “The provisions of this chapter shall apply to all
interstate and foreign communication by wire. . .”
235. 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) provides: “Except as provided in sections 223 through
227. . .nothing in this Act [47 USCS §§ 151 et seq.] shall be construed to apply or to give
the Commission jurisdiction with respect to . . . regulations for or in connection with
intrastate communication . . . ”
236. Hooters, 245 Ga. App. at 366.
237. The Senate sponsor, Sen. Edward Markey, said when introducing the bill: “The
legislation, which covers both intrastate and interstate unsolicited calls, will establish
Federal guidelines that will fill the regulatory gap due to differences in Federal and State
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C. Preemption of State Law

When Congress passed the TCPA, it clarified the effect of the
statute on similar state laws by adding a provision stipulating that it
does not preempt state laws that impose more restrictive regulations
than the TCPA, 238 nor prohibit other related activities.239 According to
Congress, “over half the states now [in 1991] have statutes restricting
various uses of the telephone for marketing.”240
D. Authority of States to Bring Suit Under the TCPA

In addition to the private action created in the TCPA, Congress
authorized state Attorneys General to bring civil actions on behalf of
its citizens.241 The damages allowed are the same as the private action
— injunctive relief and “actual monetary loss” or $500 per violation,
which may be trebled if the defendant acted “willfully” or
“knowingly.”242 Interestingly, Congress was very precise as to
jurisdiction of actions by state Attorneys General, establishing
exclusive jurisdiction in the federal court system.243

V. Sanctions for Violation of the TCPA
Congress has provided three distinct enforcement avenues for
aggrieved parties who have received unsolicited faxes banned by the
TCPA. The first alternative is the private right of action that allows
victimized recipients to file suit for damages or injunctive relief.244 The
second available enforcement opportunity is a civil lawsuit brought by
a state Attorney General, or other official or agency designated by
the individual state.245 Both injunctive relief and actual monetary loss
(or $500 in damages for each violation) are available remedies in
actions by states.246 Finally, the Federal Communications Commission
is authorized to assess and enforce a forfeiture penalty against

telemarketing regulations. This will give advertisers a single set of ground rules and
prevent them from falling through the cracks between Federal and State statutes.” 137
Cong. Rec. E793-02. (Daily Ed. Mar. 6, 1991) (emphasis added).
238. 47 U.S.C. § 227(e)(1).
239. Id. § 227(e)(1)(A)-(D).
240. Id. § 227, Cong. State. of Findings No. 7.
241. Id. § 227(f)(1).
242. Id.
243. Id. § 227(f)(2).
244. Id. § 227(b)(3).
245. Id. § 227(f)(1).
246. Id.
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violators of the TCPA.247 All of these alternatives have been used
successfully to enforce the TCPA.
A. Trial Court Judgments or Settlements in Private Actions

While there are currently no reported cases of trial judgments
being affirmed on appeal, several cases have reached the stage of
securing a trial court judgment, or have been reported as settled.
The most significant case is Nicholson v. Hooters of Augusta,
Inc., which has been previously discussed regarding appellate issues
decided in both the U. S. Federal and Georgia court systems.248
Plaintiff Nicholson’s persistence was rewarded in the Superior Court
of Richmond County, Georgia,249 when the case was tried before a
jury that rendered a verdict on March 21, 2001.250 The jury found that
the defendants had violated the TCPA by sending unsolicited
Hooters advertisements six different times to 1,321 separate members
of the class of plaintiffs, and that the faxes were transmitted willfully
and knowingly.251 Based on the jury verdict and damage provisions of
the TCPA,252 the court awarded each of the 1,321 class members $500
per individual fax ($3,000 for each person), and allowed the
discretionary treble damages, increasing the judgment for each
plaintiff to $9,000.253 On April 25, 2001, the court entered a judgment
for the plaintiff class totaling $11,889,000.254 From that amount,
Nicholson was awarded $15,000 as class representative,255 and the
attorneys were awarded $3,923,370 (one-third) of the judgment as
attorneys’ fees, plus $7,665.62 in expenses.256
On March 14, 2001, a Missouri court entered a judgment totaling
$84,500 against various defendants for violating the unsolicited fax
provisions of the TCPA.257 The court denied the request for a

247. 47 C.F.R. § 1.80(a)(2) (2002).
248. See supra III(B), IV(A)(1) and IV(B), above.
249. Civil Action File No. 95-RCCV-616, Sam Nicholson and All Other Persons or
Entities Similarly Situated v. Hooters of Augusta, Inc. and Bambi Clark, d/b/a Value-Fax of
Augusta.
250. Id.; See Judgment dated April 25, 2001 <http://www.key+law.com/faxes/
hooters.htm> (accessed Sep. 4, 2003).
251. Id.
252. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3).
253. Supra at 251.
254. Id. at paragraph 8.
255. Id. at paragraph 13.
256. Id.
257. Bob Coleman v. American Blast Fax, Case Number 00AC-005196
<http://www.junkfaxes.org/news/coleman-order.pdf> (Mo. Sep. 4, 2003).
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permanent injunction against the defendants.258
As previously stated, the Dallas Cowboys have agreed to pay
$1,730,000 to settle a class action suit filed against them.259 The
Cowboys hired American Blastfax to send 125,000 faxes offering to
sell tickets to football games.260 Each recipient of an unsolicited fax is
entitled to receive $500, and all of the funds not claimed by class
members will be paid to charities.261
News sources have reported that in April 1999, Houston Cellular
Corp. paid $400,000 to settle its portion of a TCPA case filed as a
class action against approximately 75 companies, after a trial judge
refused to grant summary judgment motions to dismiss the case. 262 In
September 1999, eight other companies in that case paid an additional
$125,000 to settle.263 Unfortunately for the settling defendants, on
March 7, 2000, the trial judge reconsidered the motion to dismiss,
found that his court did not have jurisdiction, and dismissed the
case.264
Plaintiff Rodriguez has alleged in his suit against the Dallas
Mavericks described above that the unsolicited advertisements were
sent to “approximately 90,000 facsimile numbers.”265 If the evidence
establishes that all of the advertisements were unsolicited, the
potential liability for the Mavericks is $45,000,000, with the added
possibility of treble damages awarded by the court.
B. State Enforcement By Attorneys General

In order to protect citizens of their states against violators of the
TCPA, at least four state Attorneys General have filed suit against
violators, and another has issued a “Cease and Desist Order.”
In response to over 70 complaints, the Washington Attorney
General filed suit under the TCPA, the Washington
Telecommunications Act and the Washington Consumer Protection

258. Id.
259. Jim Barlow, Junk Fax Reprise: Take ‘em to Court, Houston Chronicle
<http://www.chron.com/CS/CDA/printstory.hts/business/barlow/ 1160574> (Dec. 5, 2001).
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Ron Nissimov, Company Settles Over Junk Faxes / Houston Cellular to Pay
$400,000, Other to Fight, Houston Chronicle (Bus. sec.) 1 (April 29, 1999).
263. Ron Nissimov, Lawsuit Over Unwanted Faxes Dismissed / State Law Not
Retroactive, Did Not Cover Court Claims, Houston Chronicle A-31 (March 23, 2000).
264. Id.
265. Plaintiff’s First Amended Original Petition in Cause No. 00-10002, Reynaldo
rd
Rodriguez, et. al. v. Mark Cuban, et. al., 193 District Court, Dallas County, Texas.
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Act.266 The defendants entered into a Consent Decree with the
Attorney General, agreeing to a permanent injunction and a $90,000
judgment (consisting of $30,000 in civil penalties, $30,000 in damages
and $30,000 in attorneys fees).267 In addition, defendants agreed to a
provision that any violation of the Consent Decree would be
considered a violation of the permanent injunction, and would allow
the Attorney General to seek civil penalties up to $25,000 per
violation after entry of the Decree.268
The Illinois Attorney General settled two cases against separate
out-of-state companies that used “unsolicited faxes to misrepresent
their vacation packages to Illinois consumers.”269 In the cases, the
residents who had taken the vacations were to receive either full or
partial refunds, and those who had not yet taken the trip were to
receive full refunds.270
In Missouri, the Attorney General has delivered “a blow to stop
the deluge of paper” by filing suit against American Blast Fax, Inc.271
The suit seeks a permanent injunction, monetary restitution and civil
penalties.272
The Texas Attorney General filed suit seeking monetary
damages and injunctive relief in State of Texas v. American Blastfax,
273
Inc., alleging violation of the TCPA and the Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices Act (“DTPA”).274 On March 15, 2001, the case was tried to
the court on the issue of amount of damages for violation of the
TCPA and DTPA.275 The court found the defendants guilty of 937,500
violations of the TCPA and assessed damages of seven cents per
violation plus treble damages for some of the violations, resulting in a
verdict of $459,375.276 In what appears to be a message to other bulk
fax broadcasters, the court also found the officers of the corporate

266. State of Washington v. Fax.Com, Inc., and FaxID, Inc., No. C01-0369, Consent
Decree <http://www.junkfaxes.org/news/fax-wa.pdf> (D. Wa. Mar. 13, 2001).
267. Id. at 1.
268. Id. at ¶ 9.1.
269. Ryan Settles Two Travel Cases, Refunds Available to Illinois Consumers <http://
web.archive.org/web/20010502185035/http://www.ag.state.il.us/pressrelease/
022001.htm> (accessed Nov. 2, 2003).
270. Id at 1-2.
271. Nixon Files Federal Lawsuit to Stop Texas Business from Faxing Unsolicited Ads
to Missouri Homes, Businesses <http://www.ago.state.mo.us/060800.htm> (June 8, 2000).
272. Id.
273. 121 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1086 - 1087 (W.D. Tex. 2000).
274. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 17.41 et. seq. (West 1999).
275. Texas v. American Blastfax, 164 F. Supp. 2d 892, 894 (W.D. Tex. 2001).
276. Id. at 900-01.
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defendant personally liable for the actions of the corporation, holding
that “if the officer [of the corporation] directly participated in or
authorized the statutory violation, even though acting on behalf of
the corporation, he may be personally liable.”277
In Maryland, the Attorney General has ordered two British
companies to cease and desist from sending unsolicited fax
transmissions.278 The companies were ordered to cease accepting
payments from consumers responding to their faxes, to pay restitution
to consumers who responded by calling 900 numbers, and to pay the
investigative and administrative costs of the Attorney General.279 In
addition, there will be a hearing to determine if civil penalties will be
assessed against the violators.280
C. FCC Enforcement Actions

The TCPA, and the FCC rules providing enforcement, became
effective on December 20, 1992.281 The FCC accepts and investigates
all complaints of violations of the TCPA, and reports that over 90%
of the TCPA complaints relate to unsolicited faxes.282 Due to the
overwhelming percentage of complaints, the FCC “is intensifying its
enforcement and consumer education efforts to ensure that
consumers are protected from intrusive and illegal telemarketing
practices.”283
The FCC enforcement process begins with the issuance of a
citation that recites the alleged violation, and that notifies the alleged
violator that he/she may request a personal meeting with a
Commission official within a reasonable period of time (usually 30
days).284 If the violation continues after the citation, the Commission
may commence a forfeiture proceeding by issuing a notice of
apparent liability.285 This notice contains notification of the specific
act, rule or regulation violated, the facts upon which the commission
based its determination, the date(s) of the violation, and the amount

277. Id. at 897.
278. Attorney General Curran Orders British Companies to Stop Sending Unsolicited
Faxes <http://www.oag.state.md.us/Press/2001/041001.htm> (April 4, 2001).
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. FCC, Summary of Subjects Involved in Recent Enforcement Actions
<http://www.fcc.gov/eb/tcd/summary.html> (accessed Nov. 2, 2003).
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. 47 C.F.R. § 1.80(d).
285. 47 C.F.R. § 1.80(e).
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of the proposed forfeiture penalty.286 The alleged violator will be
given notice by certified mail,287 and will be given a reasonable time to
respond to the allegations.288 If the proposed forfeiture penalty is not
paid in full in response to the notice of apparent liability, the
Commission will consider all relevant information, and enter an
Order that cancels, reduces or enforces the penalty.289
Between July 12, 1999, and September 30, 2003, the FCC issued
76 Citations against 115 violators, 5 Notices of Apparent Liability,
and 6 Forfeiture Orders imposing fines.290
The first forfeiture assessed by the FCC was an $85,500 fine
levied against Get-Aways, Inc. on February 25, 2000.291 The FCC next
issued a forfeiture order for $47,000 against Tri-Star Marketing, Inc.,
on October 17, 2000.292 On October 31, 2000, Carolina Liquidators,
Inc., was penalized with a $230,000 forfeiture.293 On October 3, 2001,
the FCC issued a forfeiture against U.S. Notary, Inc., in the amount
of $90,000.294
On January 9, 2002, the FCC assessed the largest fine to date,
with 21st Century Faxes, Ltd., being issued a monetary forfeiture in
the amount of $1,107,500.295 In that enforcement action, 21st Century
raised the issue of applicability of the TCPA to unsolicited faxes
originating outside the United States.296 21st Century argued that it was
not subject to the TCPA because its faxes were sent from the United
Kingdom (“UK”), and because the company is “foreign-owned,
registered, and located” in the UK.297 The company argued that the
prohibitions in the TCPA applied only to “any person within the

286. 47 C.F.R. § 1.80(f)(1).
287. 47 C.F.R. § 1.80(f)(2).
288. 47 C.F.R. § 1.80(f)(3).
289. 47 C.F.R. § 1.80(f)(4).
290. TCPA Enforcement Actions <http://www.fcc.gov/eb/tcd/ufax.html> (accessed
Oct. 9, 2003).
291. Forfeiture Order FCC 00-67 <http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Enforcement/
Orders/2000/fcc00067.txt> (Mar. 2, 2000).
292. Forfeiture Order FCC 00-377 <http://www.fcc.gov/eb/Orders/fcc00377.html>
(Oct. 23, 2000).
293. Forfeiture Order FCC 00-393 <http://www.fcc.gov/eb/Orders/fcc00393.html>
(Nov. 2, 2000).
294. Forfeiture Order FCC 01-301 <http://www.fcc.gov/eb/Orders/2001/ fcc01301.pdf>
(Oct. 12, 2001).
295. Forfeiture Order FCC 02-2 <http://www.fcc.gov/eb/Orders/2002/ fcc02002.pdf>
(Jan. 11, 2002).
296. Id. at 2.
297. Id.
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United States,”298 and accordingly, the FCC did not have authority to
enforce the TCPA against it.299 The FCC rejected the argument,
emphasizing that 21st Century had “agents, employees, and offices in
the United States”300 and found that the TCPA “covers faxes sent to
the United States from foreign points so long as the company has a
presence within the United States.”301 The FCC also found the TCPA
applicable under U.S. Supreme Court decisions holding that “certain
minimum contacts and activities that are systematic and continuous
establish an entity’s presence within a locality for jurisdictional
purposes.”302 The contacts found by the FCC were 1) it had agents,
employees and offices in the U.S., 2) the phone numbers provided to
recipients to remove fax numbers from 21st Century’s list were located
within the U.S., and 3) 21st Century established various 900 phone
numbers in the U.S. for response to 21st Century’s polls.303 The FCC
also denied 21st Century’s claim that the TCPA violated the free
speech provisions of the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution.304
The latest action by the FCC is both the largest forfeiture
proposed to date, and the first against a “fax broadcaster” - one who
broadcasts faxes for other entities for a fee.305 On August 2, 2002, the
FCC issued a “Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture” against
Fax.com, Inc., and proposed a $5,379,000 forfeiture.306 In a lengthy
opinion, the Commission found that Fax.com continued sending faxes
after being issued citations by the FCC, and that the business
practices of Fax.com, Inc., constituted “a massive on-going violation
of section 227(b)(1)(C) of the Act and section 64.1200(a)(3) of the
Commission’s rules, and that Fax.com is well aware of this fact.”307

298. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1) (2001).
299. Forfeiture Order FCC 02-2 at 2.
300. Id. at 3-4.
301. Id. at 3.
302. Id. at 3-4 n.17, citing International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945); Burnham v. Superior Court of California, County of Marin, 495 U.S. 604 (1990);
and Kernan v. Kurz-Hastings, 175 F.3d 236 (2d. Cir. 1999).
303. Id. at 3-4.
304. See discussion in III(A) above.
305. File No. EB-02-TC-120, Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture
<http://www.fcc.gov/eb/Orders/2002/FCC-02-226A1.html> (Aug. 7, 2002).
306. Id. at ¶1.
307. Id. at ¶ 19.
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VI. Conclusion
During the 2001-2002 NBA season, the league fined Mavericks
owner Cuban seven times for a total of $505,000, primarily for
criticizing officials.308 When he was hit with a $250,000 fine on
January 4, 2001, he “pooh-poohed” the fine by saying he was pleased
that it was so large because the resulting publicity would generate
increased team merchandise sales.309 He also declined to appeal the
fine, and hinted that he might continue with his “outbursts and
actions concerning game officials.”310 While the NBA fines might not
have concerned the man Forbes Magazine ranked as the 158th richest
American in 2001,311 perhaps Cuban will react differently to the
potential liability available through the court system under the
TCPA. It remains to be seen whether Rodriguez will prove his
allegations, but if he is successful in his class action suit, Cuban’s
location on the next Forbes list could plummet.
The message Congress has sent to marketers such as Cuban and
the Mavericks is unmistakable – do not send fax advertisements
without the receiver’s “prior express invitation or permission.”312 By
enacting the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, Congress has
warned telemarketers that it is going to protect individuals who do
not want to be “terrorized” by their tactics.
Further, by creating damages for each violation and allowing
treble damages, Congress has placed any violator of the TCPA at risk
of enormous potential liability that could be financially catastrophic.
Therefore, in an unusual twist on the normal sale and purchase
transaction, Congress exclaims “caveat venditor” – let the seller
beware!

fined, suspended
for gesture
308. ESPN.com News
Services, Cuban
<http://espn.go.com/nba/news/2001/0413/1172561.html> (Apr. 19, 2001).
309. Henry Liao, Fiery Cuban <http://web.archive.org/web/20010129030600/
http://www.inquirer.net/issues/jan2001/jan13/sports/spo_7.htm> (Jan. 13, 2001).
310. Detroit News, NBA fines Cuban $250,000 <http://detnews.com/2001/pistons
/0101/07/e04-172120.htm> (Jan. 5, 2001).
311. Forbes 400 Richest in America <http://www.forbes.com/lists/home.jhtml?
passListId=54&passYear=2001&passListType=Person> (accessed Sep. 5, 2003).
312. 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(4) (2001).
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Epilogue
The case discussed in the Introduction section of this article,
313
Rodriguez v. Cuban, has been settled. The case was consolidated
with another class action suit, and settled prior to trial. District Judge
Mary Murphy approved a settlement agreement on October 21,
2002.314 The agreement required the Dallas Mavericks (or related
entities) to establish a settlement fund of $650,000. The parties agreed
that the funds would be disbursed as follows: $109,500 to qualifying
class members filing proofs of claim (at a rate of $500 for each
facsimile received and confirmed on facsimile confirmation logs);
$5,000 each to the three class representatives; $230,000 in total
attorneys fees; $73,795 for court costs; $96,705 to the Dallas
Mavericks Foundation; and a refund of $125,000 to the Dallas
Mavericks.315

313. Supra n. 2.
314. Tracey Hutchins, et. al., v. Dallas Basketball Limited, et. al., No. 01-10644-A (Tex.
Dist. Ct. Dallas County Dist. filed Oct. 21, 2002), available at <www.keytlaw.com/
faxes/hutchinsvmavericks.htm> (accessed Sep. 25, 2003).
315. Id.

